Türkiye's Defense Industry at 80% Domestic Production: From Bayraktar TB2 to KAAN

Why It Matters

Türkiye says about 80% of its defense needs are now met by domestic production, up from a small fraction two decades ago, according to statements by the Presidency and the Presidency of Defence Industries (SSB). The claim matters because it shapes how Ankara approaches NATO burden-sharing, arms-export policy, and its freedom to act when foreign suppliers impose restrictions. The figure is real as an official metric but must be read with care: 'domestic' describes programs and systems led by Turkish firms, not necessarily every part inside them.

Background

Türkiye's modern defense-industrial story is closely tied to supply disruptions. After the 20 July 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation, the US Congress imposed an arms embargo on Türkiye in 1975, which was lifted in 1978. Ankara often cites this episode as the origin of its drive for self-reliance (see Why Did Türkiye Intervene in Cyprus in 1974? Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee). Several Turkish defense firms, including Aselsan, Roketsan and later TAI, trace their roots to the years after that embargo.

Key milestones

Period	Development
1975-1978	US arms embargo on Türkiye; later cited by Ankara as a turning point
1985	Predecessor of the SSB established to coordinate procurement and industrial policy
2011	First MİLGEM-class corvette (TCG Heybeliada) enters service
2016-2020	Operations Euphrates Shield, Olive Branch, Peace Spring and Spring Shield showcase armed UAVs and domestic land systems
2018	SSB placed under the Presidency of the Republic
2019	Türkiye removed from the F-35 program after acquiring the Russian S-400 system
2020	US CAATSA sanctions imposed on the SSB (announced December 2020)
2022	Kızılelma unmanned combat aircraft flies for the first time (December)
2023	TCG Anadolu amphibious assault ship delivered to the Turkish Navy (April)
2024	KAAN fifth-generation fighter prototype makes its first flight (February)

The '80%' figure is generally attributed to Turkish officials, who have said that the domestic share of Türkiye's military needs was far lower, often cited as around 20%, in the early 2000s. Because no common international methodology exists for measuring 'domestic share', the number should be treated as an official, program-level estimate.

Main system families

Category	Examples	Notes
UAVs / UCAVs	Bayraktar TB2, Akıncı, Aksungur, ANKA, Kızılelma	Developed by Baykar and TAI; TB2 used in multiple conflicts
Aircraft	Hürjet (jet trainer), Hürkuş (trainer/light attack), T129 ATAK (attack helicopter), KAAN (fifth-generation fighter)	KAAN is led by TAI; engine strategy is evolving
Naval	TCG Anadolu, MİLGEM corvettes and frigates, Reis-class submarines	Reis-class is based on a German design built under license in Türkiye
Missiles and air defense	ATMACA, SOM, HİSAR-O, SİPER, KORAL	Developed by Roketsan, TÜBİTAK SAGE and Aselsan
Land systems	Fırtına howitzer, Kirpi, Vuran, MEMATT	Mix of national design and adapted foreign technology

Key Players & Positions

Türkiye's industry and institutions

The SSB, the Ministry of National Defense (MSB) and firms such as Aselsan, Roketsan, Baykar, TAI, MKE and the shipyards form the core ecosystem. Official Turkish sources describe a model in which the state defines requirements, funds research and development, and then relies on national companies and subcontractors, including a large network of small and medium-sized enterprises.

NATO and allies

Türkiye has been a NATO member since 1952 and operates the alliance's second-largest armed forces by personnel size. NATO officially welcomes allied defense-industrial capacity, and at the 2025 Hague summit allies agreed on a target of 5% of GDP for defense and security-related spending by 2035. Turkish systems such as the TB2 are in service with several NATO members' forces, and some allies cooperate with Turkish firms on specific programs. At the same time, NATO officials and members have raised concerns about Türkiye's S-400 purchase and its interoperability implications.

The United States and European suppliers

Washington's stated reason for the 2019 F-35 removal and the 2020 CAATSA sanctions was the S-400 acquisition, which US officials said risked compromising the F-35 and NATO systems. Ankara disagrees with that assessment. Some European governments have limited exports of components, for example, Canada suspended export permits for certain targeting-sensor equipment in 2019 and later cancelled them, citing concerns about use in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Ankara responded by accelerating national alternatives for the relevant subsystems.

Critics and human rights organizations

Some human rights groups and analysts have questioned the use of armed drones in northern Iraq and Syria, raising civilian-harm concerns. Ankara rejects these allegations, saying its operations target PKK/YPG (the PKK is designated a terrorist organization by Türkiye, the United States, NATO and the European Union) and DAESH, with precautions to protect civilians. Other critics argue that high-profile platforms mask continuing dependence on foreign engines, semiconductors and certain sensors.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Sources

Türkiye's Position

Ankara's stated rationale rests on sovereignty, security and alliance contribution. The points below summarize positions expressed by the Presidency, the MSB and the SSB.

• Strategic autonomy is a security necessity. According to the Presidency and the SSB, the experience of the 1975 embargo and the 2019 F-35 exclusion shows that dependence on a single supplier is a strategic vulnerability. Reaching about 80% domestic production is presented as a way to guarantee that Turkish forces can train, maintain and operate their equipment regardless of foreign political decisions.
• The industry serves the right of self-defense. Ankara points to Article 51 of the UN Charter as the legal basis for its counter-terrorism operations along its roughly 1,300 km (about 800 miles) southern border, and the MSB describes domestically produced UAVs, armored vehicles and electronic-warfare systems as the tools that make a 'neutralize terrorism at its source' approach possible while limiting risk to personnel. See Counter-Terrorism at the Source: Article 51, Border Security and Türkiye's Defense Industry.
• Capability strengthens NATO, it does not compete with it. Turkish officials argue that a stronger national industry increases allied capacity, a position consistent with the Washington Treaty's Article 3, which commits allies to develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack. The MSB notes Türkiye's contributions to NATO missions and its role as an ally that fights DAESH on the ground.
• Exports are conducted under state oversight. The Presidency and the SSB state that defense exports require government authorization and are tied to Türkiye's foreign-policy and security considerations. Ankara rejects the characterization of its exports as destabilizing and argues that it is being held to a standard that traditional arms-exporting countries do not apply to themselves.
• The portfolio protects Turkish waters and airspace. Ankara links naval programs such as TCG Anadolu, MİLGEM and Reis-class submarines to the protection of Turkish rights in the Blue Homeland, in line with positions explained in Blue Homeland and the Eastern Mediterranean: A Complete Guide to Maritime Jurisdiction.

The legal and historical basis cited by Ankara therefore combines the UN Charter's Article 51, NATO's Article 3, and the lessons of the 1975-1978 embargo.

What the Platforms Show, and What They Do Not

UAVs and UCAVs

The Bayraktar TB2 became internationally known after its use in Syria, Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh and Ukraine. Its follow-ons, the Akıncı and TAI's Aksungur, offer greater payload and endurance, and the Kızılelma is intended as a jet-powered unmanned combat aircraft. Turkish firms stress their national integration of airframes, flight-control software and many mission systems. Independent analysts note that engines and some electronic parts have long been sourced from abroad, although national engine programs are progressing.

Aircraft

The Hürjet jet trainer, the Hürkuş trainer and light-attack aircraft and the T129 ATAK helicopter represent a pathway from licensed production to national design. The T129 was developed with Italian-British partners' technology and uses a foreign-origin engine, which illustrates why 'domestic' is not the same as 'fully indigenous'. The KAAN fighter is Türkiye's most ambitious project: its first prototype flew in February 2024, and Turkish officials describe a planned shift toward a national engine. Timelines for serial production remain subject to testing and funding, and we do not cite unverified delivery dates.

Naval systems

The MİLGEM program built corvettes and frigates at Turkish yards, and TCG Anadolu, a multi-purpose amphibious assault ship based on a Spanish design, was built in Türkiye and gives the navy the ability to operate helicopters and unmanned systems. The Reis-class is built under license from a German design, with growing Turkish content. This shows that some of Türkiye's progress comes from technology transfer rather than purely original design.

Missiles and air defense

ATMACA (anti-ship) and SOM (air-launched cruise missile) are Turkish-designed weapons. HİSAR-O is a medium-range air-defense system, SİPER a longer-range system, and KORAL an electronic-warfare system, all part of what officials call the 'Steel Dome' layered air-defense concept. Public information on operational performance is limited, so evaluations should rely on official and independent sources where available.

Source Comparison

Question	Turkish official sources	Western and international analysis
What does '80%' mean?	A program-level indicator of national share in defense needs, reported by the Presidency and SSB	A useful but non-standard metric; critics note that engines, sensors and microelectronics can still be imported
Why did Türkiye build a national industry?	Response to embargoes (1975-1978) and to the 2019 F-35 exclusion; sovereignty	Often agrees on the causal role of embargoes, but some analysts also stress domestic politics and export ambitions
Role in NATO	A contribution to allied capacity and a source of interoperable systems	Mixed: recognized as strengthening capacity, but the S-400 purchase is seen as a problem
Drone use	Counter-terrorism under Article 51; precautions to protect civilians	Human rights groups raise civilian-harm questions; Ankara rejects them
Exports	Government-authorized and consistent with foreign policy	Debates over end-use controls and destinations; figures vary by source and are not cited here

Readers should compare official statements with independent databases and reporting, and treat any single export or delivery number with caution. For methodology, see Editorial Principles: How World Agenda Review Separates Fact from Position.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• SSB (Presidency of Defence Industries): The Turkish government body that manages procurement and industrial policy; it reports to the Presidency.
• MSB: The Ministry of National Defense, which oversees the Turkish Armed Forces' requirements and operations.
• UAV / UCAV: Unmanned aerial vehicle / unmanned combat aerial vehicle.
• CAATSA: The US 'Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act', used in December 2020 to sanction the SSB.
• Strategic autonomy: The capacity of a state to make security decisions without being constrained by a single supplier.
• Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan): Türkiye's doctrine of maritime jurisdiction, in which naval capability plays a supporting role.

Related reading: Counter-Terrorism at the Source, Blue Homeland and the Eastern Mediterranean, The Montreux Convention and the Black Sea, The World Is Bigger Than Five and the World Agenda Review home page.

This article reflects World Agenda Review's editorial perspective that presents Türkiye's official positions and legal theses alongside the wider global debate. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN and IOC-UNESCO documents, official statements and archival records. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources. — World Agenda Review Editorial Team

Cross-Publication Dossiers & Sister Desk Perspectives

For complementary primary-source analysis across our specialist editorial network, consult:

• Index of Nations: Türkiye's Defense Industry: From Bayraktar TB2 to KAAN and the 80 Percent Domestic Production Claim — How Türkiye's defense industry works, from Bayraktar TB2 to KAAN: what the 80% domestic production claim means, export-control concerns, and rankings.
• Archive of Nations: Türkiye's Defense Industry at 80% Domestic Production: From Bayraktar TB2 to KAAN — How Türkiye's defense industry reached an official ~80% domestic production rate, from Bayraktar TB2 to KAAN and TCG Anadolu, with critics' views.
• Gazetteer of Nations: Türkiye's Defense Industry: From Bayraktar TB2 to KAAN and the 80 Percent Domestic Production Claim — How much of Türkiye's defense equipment is made at home? Ankara cites about 80%. A sourced guide to the Turkish defense industry, Bayraktar to KAAN.