Fact Check & Verification· did Turkish Cypriots reject the Annan Plan 2004 referendum results

Fact Check: Did Turkish Cypriots Reject the Annan Plan? What the 2004 Referendum Results Actually Show

Did Turkish Cypriots reject the Annan Plan 2004 referendum results? No: 64.91% voted Yes, 75.83% of Greek Cypriots voted No. Primary-source fact check.

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By World Agenda Review Editorial Team

Published: October 27, 2026

⏱ 11 min read (2,220 words)

Executive Summary & Key Facts

On 24 April 2004, Turkish Cypriots approved the Fifth revision of the Annan Plan with 64.91% 'Yes', while Greek Cypriots rejected it with 75.83% 'No'; the 'both sides rejected it' framing is factually wrong.
The plan required approval in both simultaneous referendums, so the Greek Cypriot 'No' alone was enough to prevent its entry into force.
On 1 May 2004, the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCASC) joined the EU as the representative of the whole island, with the acquis suspended in the north under Protocol 10 to the 2003 Act of Accession.
The Council of the EU conclusions of 26 April 2004 and the UN Secretary-General's report S/2004/437 both recorded the divergent results and addressed the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots, but the Direct Trade Regulation has never been adopted.
Ankara argues that the 2004 outcome, followed by Crans-Montana (2017), Geneva (2021) and the New York meeting of 15 October 2024, shows the federation model is exhausted and that a settlement must start from the sovereign equality of the Turkish Cypriot people.

Why It Matters

No, Turkish Cypriots did not reject the Annan Plan; they approved it. In separate, simultaneous referendums on 24 April 2004, Turkish Cypriots voted 64.91% 'Yes', while Greek Cypriots voted 75.83% 'No'. The shorthand that 'both sides said no', or that 'Turkish Cypriots and Ankara blocked the plan', is contradicted by the official vote record.

This matters because the claim shapes how the unresolved Cyprus issue is explained. If the 2004 result is misremembered, the later EU accession of the Greek Cypriot side, the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots and the current debate over federation versus two sovereign states are all misread. This fact check follows the approach set out in our Editorial Principles: facts and chronology first, Türkiye's position in a clearly labelled section.

Background

The legal baseline is the 1959–1960 settlement. The Zurich and London Agreements of 11 February 1959 produced the 1960 Republic of Cyprus as a bi-communal partnership state. Its constitution gave Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots co-founder status, a Turkish Cypriot Vice President with a veto, and separate majorities on key legislation. The 1960 Treaty of Guarantee made Türkiye, Greece and the United Kingdom guarantor powers. For the detailed legal framework, see The Cyprus Issue: 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, Federation Talks and the Two-State Solution.

The partnership broke down in 1963–1964. On 30 November 1963, Archbishop Makarios proposed 13 constitutional amendments, including curbs on the Vice President's veto. After their rejection, violence began on 21 December 1963. Turkish Cypriots were pushed out of state organs, and Nicosia was divided by the Green Line on 30 December 1963. UN Security Council Resolution 186 of 4 March 1964 then dealt with the Greek Cypriot administration as the government of Cyprus. Ankara regards that as the origin of a lasting status asymmetry. The UN and EU, for their part, treat the Republic of Cyprus as the continuing internationally recognized state.

Federation became the UN framework. The High-Level Agreements of 1977 (Makarios–Denktaş) and 1979 (Kyprianou–Denktaş) set the goal of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. Later Security Council resolutions repeated that formula.

The Annan Plan process ran from 2002 to 2004.

November 2002: UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan presented the first version under his Good Offices mission.
December 2002 – March 2003: Revisions followed, as the EU Copenhagen summit approached and then passed. The Hague talks in March 2003 ended without agreement to put the text to referendums; Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş declined to agree to that step.
March 2004: Talks at Bürgenstock, Switzerland, with Greece and Türkiye participating, produced the Fourth and then the Fifth revision, which the Secretary-General finalized for a vote.
24 April 2004: Simultaneous referendums were held on the two sides of the island. Approval in both was required for the plan to enter into force.
1 May 2004: Cyprus acceded to the EU, represented by the Greek Cypriot administration, with the acquis suspended in areas not under its effective control.

The Fifth revision proposed a United Cyprus Republic with two constituent states. It retained the guarantee and alliance treaties and provided for phased reductions in troop numbers. A longer account of the vote is available from our partner site Crossroads Review.

Claim vs. Fact Analysis

Claim 1: 'Both sides said no in 2004'

Claim. Variants of this line appear in press shorthand, in some EU-level rhetoric about a 'missed opportunity', and in some academic summaries. They suggest a shared refusal.

Fact. The result figures were: Turkish Cypriots 64.91% 'Yes'; Greek Cypriots 75.83% 'No'. The two electorates voted in opposite directions. The plan was not rejected by the Turkish Cypriot side; it failed because the dual-approval requirement was not met in the south.

Claim 2: 'Turkish Cypriots and Ankara obstructed the plan'

Claim. Commentary sometimes projects the stance of Denktaş in 2002–2003 onto the final outcome.

Fact. Denktaş did oppose the plan and did refuse to agree to referendums at The Hague in 2003. That earlier record is real, and Greek Cypriot and EU commentators cite it. But the question decided on 24 April 2004 was the Fifth revision, and the Turkish Cypriot electorate approved it. The Turkish Cypriot political leadership that campaigned for 'Yes' and the Turkish government of the day also supported the plan. On the Greek Cypriot side, President Tassos Papadopoulos publicly urged rejection, and the largest left-wing party AKEL also recommended 'No'. The right-of-centre DISY supported approval, so Greek Cypriot opinion was not uniform, but the vote was decisive.

Claim 3: 'The plan was an agreed UN settlement that one side wrecked'

Claim. Some summaries treat the plan as an endorsed UN text.

Fact. The plan was drafted by the Secretary-General under his Good Offices mission and put to the people by agreement for the referendum stage. It was not a Security Council-adopted settlement. A draft Council resolution on the eve of the vote, on 21 April 2004, was not adopted after a Russian veto. Whatever one thinks of the plan, it was a proposal that required a 'Yes' from both peoples, not a binding award.

Claim 4: 'The Greek Cypriot side was not rewarded; the vote had no consequences'

Fact. Accession on 1 May 2004 had been fixed by the Treaty of Accession signed in Athens on 16 April 2003. It was not made conditional on a settlement. After the vote, the Republic of Cyprus, represented by the Greek Cypriot administration, became an EU member for the whole island. Protocol 10 to the Act of Accession suspended the acquis in the areas where the Republic's government does not exercise effective control. It also provides that the Council may decide, by unanimity, on the terms of withdrawing that suspension in the event of a settlement.

Key Players & Positions

UN Secretary-General and Good Offices. The Secretary-General's report of May 2004 (S/2004/437) recorded the outcome of the two referendums as they were: a majority in favour among Turkish Cypriots and a majority against among Greek Cypriots. In the report he also invited the Security Council to give a lead to states in eliminating unnecessary restrictions and barriers that have the effect of isolating the Turkish Cypriots and impeding their development. Readers should consult the report text directly for exact wording.

Greek Cypriot leadership. President Papadopoulos and other opponents argued that the plan's security provisions, including the continuing role of guarantees and Turkish troops, were inadequate. They also objected to arrangements on settlers and property, to the phasing of returns and territorial adjustment, to the timetable of implementation, and to doubts about functionality and cost. These are the stated reasons and they are legitimate arguments in the debate, whether or not one agrees with them.

Greece and the United Kingdom. Both are guarantor powers and EU members. Greece took part at Bürgenstock and left the decision to the Cypriot electorates. The UK supported the plan and, after the vote, supported measures for the Turkish Cypriots.

EU institutions. The Council of the EU conclusions of 26 April 2004 expressed regret at the Greek Cypriot result and welcomed the Turkish Cypriot vote. In substance, the Council said it was determined to put an end to the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community and to facilitate reunification by encouraging its economic development, and it invited the Commission to bring forward proposals. Two measures followed: the Green Line Regulation (866/2004) and a financial aid regulation (adopted in 2006). The Commission's July 2004 proposal for a Direct Trade Regulation was not adopted by the Council. EU sources dispute that this amounts to a broken promise. They point to legal-basis disagreements, to the Republic of Cyprus's objections concerning ports and customs, and to the continuing application of the Green Line trade rules.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Sources

Türkiye's Position

Ankara's position, as set out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in the President's addresses to the UN General Assembly and in Turkish statements to the UN, can be summarized as follows.

The Turkish Cypriots said 'Yes' to a settlement based on political equality. According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry's published position on Cyprus, the 64.91% vote showed that Turkish Cypriots accepted a federal arrangement in good faith, despite Denktaş's opposition, with the support of the Turkish government of the day.
The side that rejected the plan was not held to account. Ankara argues that GCASC's EU entry on 1 May 2004, without a settlement, removed any Greek Cypriot incentive to share power on the basis of equality. It also argues that this conflicts with Article I of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, which bars Cyprus from political or economic union with any state, and with the bi-communal character of the 1960 constitution.
The promised end to Turkish Cypriot isolation was not delivered. Turkish officials, including in speeches at the UN, point to the 26 April 2004 Council conclusions and to the Direct Trade Regulation, which remains unadopted. Brussels and Nicosia dispute this reading.
Federation has been tested and exhausted. Ankara cites the failure at Crans-Montana (June–July 2017), the informal 5+UN meeting in Geneva (April 2021) and the New York trilateral meeting of 15 October 2024 as evidence that no common ground for a federal model exists. The Turkish side holds that 50 years of talks since 1977 lead to the same conclusion.
A settlement must begin from sovereign equality. President Erdoğan has told the UN General Assembly that a lasting solution requires recognition of the equal international status of the Turkish Cypriot people, leading to two sovereign states. The legal basis cited is the Treaty of Guarantee (Articles II and IV), the 1960 partnership constitution with its co-founder status for both peoples, and the right of self-determination. Ankara also rests its case on the 1974 intervention under Article IV, described in Why Did Türkiye Intervene in Cyprus in 1974?.

Other views. Greek Cypriot and EU sources reject the two-state premise. They point to UN Security Council Resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984), which called the TRNC declaration legally invalid, and to Security Council resolutions that endorse a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. They also note that political opinion among Turkish Cypriots is not uniform, and that its leadership has changed since 2004 and since the 2024 meeting.

Source Comparison

Framing	What the primary record shows	Where sources dispute interpretation
'Both sides rejected the plan'	Turkish Cypriots 64.91% 'Yes'; Greek Cypriots 75.83% 'No' (24 April 2004 referendum results).	Few sources dispute the figures. Some commentators emphasize the earlier 2002–2003 refusals of Denktaş.
'Turkish Cypriots and Ankara obstructed a UN plan'	The Secretary-General's report S/2004/437 records the divergent outcome. The plan required approval by both sides.	Greek Cypriot sources say the plan lacked adequate security and implementation guarantees.
'The Greek Cypriot vote was a rejection of reunification itself'	The plan's text and the stated Greek Cypriot objections are on the record.	Ankara says the vote showed unwillingness to share power. Greek Cypriot sources say they rejected this specific plan, not federation.
'EU accession was unconnected to the vote'	The 2003 Treaty of Accession fixed the date. Protocol 10 suspended the acquis in the north.	Ankara says accession without settlement rewarded refusal. The EU says accession was never conditional and that it protects Cypriot rights.
'The Turkish Cypriot isolation was ended'	Council conclusions of 26 April 2004 expressed the intention. The Green Line and aid regulations were adopted. The Direct Trade Regulation was not.	Brussels and Nicosia cite legal and customs objections. Ankara calls this a failure to deliver.

A summary of why the process failed is also provided by The Polity Brief and by Regions & Powers. Other examples of media claims tested against records are collected in Fact Check: Common Claims About Türkiye in International Media.

Annan Plan: The settlement proposal prepared by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 2002–2004. The Fifth revision, finalized after Bürgenstock, was the version put to referendums.
Bi-zonal, bi-communal federation: The framework first set out in the 1977 and 1979 High-Level Agreements and repeated in UN resolutions. Ankara argues that the Greek Cypriot side's refusal to share power makes it unworkable.
Acquis suspension (Protocol 10): The mechanism that suspended EU law in areas where the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control, pending a settlement.
Good Offices: The Secretary-General's mandate to assist the parties, as distinct from adjudicating or imposing an outcome.
Sovereign equality: The principle, as used by Türkiye and the TRNC, that Turkish Cypriots hold equal international status as a co-founding people. It underpins the two-state proposal.

World Agenda Review presents global affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources. This article reflects World Agenda Review's editorial perspective that presents Türkiye's official positions and legal theses alongside the wider global debate. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN documents, official statements and archival records. — World Agenda Review Editorial Team

Frequently asked questions

Who voted yes and no in the 2004 Annan Plan referendums, and by how much?

On 24 April 2004, Turkish Cypriots approved the Fifth revision of the plan with 64.91% 'Yes'. Greek Cypriots rejected it with 75.83% 'No'. The referendums were held separately and simultaneously, and approval in both was required for the plan to take effect.

Was the Annan Plan UN-backed?

It was prepared by the UN Secretary-General under his Good Offices mission, and he finalized the Fifth revision after the Bürgenstock talks. It was not, however, a settlement adopted by the Security Council: a draft resolution before the vote was not adopted. It was a proposal that depended on a 'Yes' from both peoples.

Why was Cyprus admitted to the EU after the vote?

The accession date had been fixed by the Treaty of Accession signed in Athens on 16 April 2003, and membership was not made conditional on a settlement. On 1 May 2004, the Republic of Cyprus, represented by the Greek Cypriot administration, joined for the whole island. Ankara argues this rewarded the side that rejected the plan; EU institutions say accession was never conditional.

What is Protocol 10?

Protocol 10 on Cyprus is part of the 2003 Act of Accession. It suspends the application of EU law (the acquis) in areas where the Republic of Cyprus's government does not exercise effective control, and it allows the Council to decide unanimously on the terms of lifting the suspension in the event of a settlement.

Why does Ankara say the federation model has failed?

Ankara points to the 2004 outcome, Crans-Montana in 2017, the Geneva meeting in 2021 and the New York trilateral meeting of 15 October 2024, none of which produced common ground. It holds that the Greek Cypriot side will not share power on the basis of equality, and that a settlement must start from the sovereign equality and equal international status of the Turkish Cypriot people, leading to two sovereign states. Greek Cypriot and EU sources reject this and continue to support a federal settlement.

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